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THE RIGHT OF INTERVENTION OF 
COASTAL STATES ON THE HIGH SEAS IN CASES OF 
POLLUTION CASUALTIES
Claude C . Emanuelli*
“ In certain circumstances the state cannot await the arrival of a danger to 
its security within its own territorial jurisdiction, but must take measures to 
prevent that danger from materialising while still outside its territorial 
jurisdiction. In this case the state may claim a measure of “ protective 
jurisdiction” and use force in the exercise of that jurisdiction beyond the 
limits of state territory.”1
The question of  the existence o f  a right of  intervention of  coastal 
S ta tes  on the high seas following pollution casualties2 arose in rela­
tion to the Torrey Canyon incident in M arch 1967,
The Torrey Canyon3 was a Liberian tanker which ran aground 
on the Seven Stones Reef,4 12 miles off  the British coast, i.e. on the 
high seas,5 causing m ajor  pollution dam age  to the British and French 
coastlines and related interests .6
In order to minimize any further pollution, the British govern­
ment first a t tem pted  to rescue the tanker ;  but,  following the failure 
o f  a t tem pts  at salvage it was decided to bom b the wreck in order  to 
set it afire. At tha t  time, the decision o f  the British governm ent was a
* Assistant Professor of Law at the University of New Brunswick, Lie. Droit, 
LL.M., D.J.
1 D.W. Bowett, Self-Defence In International Law (1958), p. 66.
2 The first international efforts to combat sea pollution go back to the League of 
Nations and the Washington Conference of 1926. Nevertheless, the problem of 
pollution did not become a matter of public concern and of international an­
tagonism until it was dealt with by the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization (IM CO) after World War II.
3 It was carrying most modern navigational aids and was classed 100 A-1, the 
highest standard by Lloyd's Register of Shipping. The Liberian board of investiga­
tion found that the stranding was entirely due to the negligence of the master of the 
ship. See E.D. Brown, The Lessons of the Torrey Canyon (1969) 21 Current Legal 
Problems, p. 113, at p. 114.
4 Navigational hazard between the Isles of Scilly and Land’s End.
5 The United Kindgom has made no claim in relation to the establishment of a con­
tiguous zone and could not refer to the provisions of Article 24(1) of the Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone under which a coastal 
State is given "the control necessary to prevent infringement of its sanitary regula­
tions within its territory or territorial sea” , see text in 1958, 52 American Journal 
o f International Law , p. 834.
6 60,000 tons of oil were released causing damage estimated to $18 million.
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very dar ing  one and in the abs trac t  seemed contra ry  to  In ternational 
Law o f  the Sea principles. Indeed, the Torrey Canyon was flying a 
foreign flag and was on the high seas when the incident occurred; 
therefore, the Torrey Canyon was theoretically protected by the 
principle o f  exclusive jurisdic tion o f  the flag S tate ,  corro lary  to the 
principle o f  the freedom o f  the high seas.7
The adoption  o f  m easures o f  intervention by the British govern­
ment was in fact strongly criticized, first within the United  Kingdom 
by the C h a m b e r  of  Shipping for the very dangerous precedent it 
crea ted ,8 second outside the U nited  Kingdom  by the French govern­
m ent which asserted that con tra ry  to its objectives, the bom bing of  
the Torrey Canyon resulted in further pollution of  the French coast,  
225 miles away from the place o f  the casualty .
O n its part ,  faced with these criticisms, the British government 
was invoking a right o f  self-protection under general In ternational 
Law principles.’
Nevertheless, whether the British governm ent was sure o f  its 
rights under this doctrine or not,  it was also conscious o f  the a m ­
biguity o f  In ternational Law on the question"’ as well as o f  the divi­
sion between coasta l and flag States abou t its issues. Therefore, with 
a view to clarifying the position o f  coasta l S tates  in similar s ituations 
and seeing her rights recognized, G rea t  Britain seized the Inter- 
Governmental M aritime Consultative Organization" with the 
problem .
On M ay 4, 1967, the Council o f  I M C O  was convened at an ex­
trao rd ina ry  meeting and asked by the British G overnm ent to study 
three categories o f  problems:
—  Preventive measures against oil pollution;
—  M easures  to limit the extent o f  dam age;
—  Necessary changes in In ternational L aw .i:
In order  to deal at best with the legal aspects o f  these questions, 
the Council proposed the creation  of  an ad-hoc Legal C om m ittee  
within the O rganization .  This ad-hoc com m ittee  has since become a 
perm anen t organ of  I M C O .11
7 See Convention on the High Seas, especially Articles 2 and 6 in 1958, 52 American 
Journal o f International Law, p. 842.
8 See E.D. Brown, supra note 3, p. 114 note 5.
9 See Article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute o f  the International Court o f Justice.
10 See part B of this paper.
11 Hereinafter IMCO.
12 IMCO Doc. C /E S . 111/3 April 18, 1967.
13 See J.P. Quéneudec, Les incidences du Torrey Canyon sur le droit de la mer 
(1968), Annuaire Français de Droit International, pp. 709-710.
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In relation to the questions presented by the British government 
to  IM C O ,  the Legal C om m ittee  was instructed by the Council to 
consider:
"The extent to which a State directly threatened or affected by a casualty 
which takes place outside its territorial sea can, or should be enabled to, 
take measures to protect its coastline, harbours, territorial sea or amenities, 
even when such measures may affect the interest of shipowners, salvage 
companies and insurers and even of a flag government.”14
The work of  the Legal C o m m ittee  on this m a tte r  resulted in a 
recom m enda tion  for the convening o f  an international conference in­
tended to define the rights o f  coasta l S ta tes  vis-à-vis pollution 
casualties off  their shores .15 In this respect, the Legal C om m ittee  
draf ted  the provisions o f  a proposed t re a ty .16 The Assembly of  
I M C O  agreeing on the proposal o f  the Legal C om m ittee  convened 
an in ternational conference at Brussels in N ovem ber 1967.17 The 
conference resulted in the adoption o f  an International Convention 
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases o f  Oil Pollution 
Casualties . 1H The provisions of  this Convention are very s im ilar to 
those o f  the d raf t  convention o f  the Legal C om m ittee .
A /  THE R IG H T  OF IN TE R V E N T IO N  UNDER THE 1969
C O N V E N TIO N :
U nder  the 1969 Convention, the right o f  intervention o f  coastal 
S ta tes  on the high seas in cases o f  oil pollution casualties is expressly 
recognized. The  Convention provides also for some limitations to the 
exercise o f  the right o f  intervention, and sanctions in cases of 
wrongful exercise o f  this right.
M oreover, the provisions o f  the 1969 Convention must be read 
in the light of  two basic observations:
— The 1969 Convention is m eant to be a limitation on the 
freedom o f  the high seas, understood here as a license to pollute, and 
on its corollary the principle o f  exclusive jurisdiction of  the flag S ta te  
in cases o f  oil pollution casualties. In this respect,  although the 
pream ble  em phasizes tha t measures adopted according to the right 
o f  intervention “ do not affect the principle o f  freedom o f  the high 
seas” , 1'* it is suggested tha t  this r ight does interfere with the usual un­
derstanding o f  tha t  principle.
14 IM CO Doc. C /ES . 111/5 para. 15.
15 See IM CO Doc. LEG. II/4 , Dec. II , 1967.
16 See IMCO Doc. LEG. 1II/2, June 18, 1968.
17 From Nov. 10 to Nov. 29, 1969.
18 See text in 1970, 64 American Journal o f  International Law, pp. 171-480, 
hereinafter the 1969 Convention
19 Meaning here freedom of communications.
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— These limitations are widely understood in accordance with 
the recom m endations o f  the Council and Legal C om m ittee  of  
IM C O , and the 1969 Convention is coastal S ta te  or “ vic tim” 
oriented. This orientation  is defined in ra ther  d ram a tic  term s in the 
pream ble which recognizes the need to protect the interests o f  the 
parties’ peoples “ against the grave consequences o f  a m aritim e 
casualty  resulting in danger o f  oil pollution o f  sea and coastlines.” 
The pream ble  also emphasizes “ tha t  under these circumstances 
measures o f  an exceptional charac te r  to  protect such interests might 
be necessary on the high seas . .
Thus, the 1969 Convention gran ts  large powers to coastal S tates 
on the high seas in cases of  oil pollution casualties. The limitations 
brought to these powers by the Convention are tan tam o u n t  to a 
reasonable exercise of  the right o f  intervention by coasta l S ta tes  
within the scope of  this right. The sanctions for an  im proper use of  
the right o f  intervention are extremely difficult to be enforced and 
work in favour of  coastal States.
1. The exercise o f  the right o f  intervention:
The right of  inte. v-ention of  coasta l S ta tes  on the high seas in 
cases o f  oil pollution casualties is em bodied in Article 1(1) o f  the 
Convention. This key article o f  the 1969 Convention reads as fol­
lows:
"Parties to the present Convention may take such measures on the high 
seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and immi­
nent danger to their coastline or related interests from pollution or threat of 
pollution of the sea by oil, folowing upon a maritime casualty or acts related 
to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major 
harmful consequences.”
Thus, the right o f  intervention may not only be exercised with 
respect to an actual case o f  pollution but also to a th rea t of  pol­
lution,:i’ provided that there is “ grave and im m inent dan g e r” to the 
parties’ “ coastline or related interests” .21
Also, the right o f  intervention may be exercised anywhere on 
the high seas and is not limited to any kind o f  pollution control zone. 
This approach  stems from the idea that any division o f  the seas ac ­
cording to legal principles is som ewhat artificial in relation to the 
protection of  the m arine environm ent against pollution.
M oreover, the coasta l S ta te  may take any kinds of  measures 
which seem suitable at the time o f  the casualty. Indeed, Article 1(1)
20 The Convention does not provide for a definition of what constitutes a threat of 
pollution. This will probably depend on the circumstances of the maritime 
casualty as interpreted by the coastal State concerned in view of the seriousness 
and the imminence of the danger incurred.
21 In this respect, it is interesting to note the large definition of “ related interests” as 
understood under Article 2(4).
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only refers to “ such measures . . .  as may be necessary" without any 
further qualification as to the nature  o f  these m easu res . '2
F urtherm ore ,  the right o f  intervention may be exercised with 
regard to all cases o f  pollution by oil which includes here “ crude oil, 
fuel oil, diesel oil and lubricating oil“ .2'
Again, the right of  in tervention is recognized in fine  with regard 
to all categories o f  ships, tankers  or passenger carriers,  e tc . '4
Eventually, it is c lear tha t under the 1969 Convention coastal 
S tates  are granted  large rights and  powers on the high seas subject 
only to a reasonable exercise o f  these rights and powers.
2. Limitations to the exercise o f  the right o f  intervention:
U nder  the 1969 Convention these lim itations are twofold:
— S om e are related to prerequisites to the exercise of  the right 
o f  intervention;
— Som e are related to the actual exercise of  the right o f  in­
tervention.
a) Prerequisites to the exercise o f  the right o f  intervention:
These prerequisites flow from the circumstances o f  the Torre y  
Canyon episode and from the questions referred in this connection 
by the British governm ent to the Council o f  IM C O .
The right o f  intervention is limited to a m ari t im e casualty 
resulting in a case o f  pollution, involving a private owned ship o f  one 
of  the contracting  parties. Therefore, it does not apply to voluntary 
cases of  pollu tion ,25 pollution casualties resulting from the explora­
tion or exploitation o f  the continental shelf or o f  the deep seabed, " 
pollution casualties involving warships. S ta te  owned vessels used on 
governm ent non-com m ercia l services,27 or private owned vessels o f  a 
flag S ta te  which is not party  to the C onven tion .2R
22 A m on g som e o f  the possible m easures to adopt, one can think o f  tak ing over the 
control o f  the ship, setting it afloat again, tow ing it away from the threatened area, 
unloading its cargo, destroying the w reck, etc. See N orm an A. W ulf, International 
C ontrol o f  M arine Pollution (1970-71), 25 JA G , p. 52.
23 S ee  A rticle 2(3).
24 S ee  A rticle 2(2) defin ing the term “ ship” . The exclusion related to oil rigs seem s to 
be a lso  the result o f  constitu tional lim itations attached to IM C O . See Dennis M. 
O 'C onn ell. R eflections on Brussels: IM C O  and the 1969 Pollution C onventions
(1970), 3 Cornell International Law Journal, p. 161 at p. 167 note 30.
25 See A rticle 1(1) a contrario.
26 See A rticle 2(2) (b).
27 A ccording to the principle o f  soverign im m unity these vessels are expressly ex­
cluded by A rticle 1(2).
28 A lthough the C onvention  does not m ention anything on this question , this idea is 
in accordance with A rticle 34 o f  the Vienna Convention on Treaties.
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The Convention is limited to pollution by oil.2v Nevertheless, a 
resolution annexed to the text o f  the Convention  suggests the ex ­
istence of  a right o f  intervention with respect to other noxious sub­
stances and recom m ends that IM C O  should study a possible exten­
sion of  the Convention in that d irec tion .30
The right o f  intervention is subord inated  to the existence of  
“ grave and im m inent dangers . . . which may reasonably be expected 
to result in m ajor  harmful c i rcum stances.”  Nevertheless, the 
Convention does not include any inform ation which might qualify 
these terms. Thus, the coastal S ta te  will have to decide according to 
each instance. In this respect,  one can imagine tha t  the coasta l S ta te  
will take  into account the size o f  the ship, the nature o f  her cargo, 
climatic, geographical, ecological characteris tics  of  the a rea  where 
the casualty  occurred, e tc . '1
b) Procedural limitations to the exercise o f  the right o f  interven­
tion:
The limitations provided for by the Convention deal with the 
right o f  intervention prior, during and after its actual exercise.
— Prior to the exercise o f  the right of  intervention, the coastal 
S ta te  concerned is under the obligation to  consult with “ o ther  S ta tes  
affected by the m ari tim e casualty, particularly  with the flag S ta te  or 
S ta te s” , a n d  may consult with independent experts designated  by 
I M C O ."  It must also notify “ without delay the proposed m easures 
to any persons physical or corpora te  known to  the coastal S ta te ,  or 
m ade  known to it during the consulta tions, to have interests which 
can reasonably be expected to be affected by those m easures .” 34 In 
this respect, the coastal S ta te  must take  into account‘“ any views they 
m ay subm it” .35
Nevertheless, in relation to the obligation to consult,  the 
Convention provides for an escape clause “ in cases o f  ex trem e urgen­
cy” .3" Here, “ the coastal S ta te  may take  m easures rendered neces­
sary by the urgency of  the situation, without prior notification or 
consulta tion  or without continuing consulta tions already begun” .37
29 See A rticle l( I ).
30 S ee  part C o f  this paper.
31 S ee J.P. Q uéneudec, supra  note 12. p. 751.
32 S ee A rticle 3(a).
33 S ee A rticle 3(c). In this respect A rticle 4 describes the procedures under which the 
list o f  experts will be set up.
34 See A rticle 3(b).
35 Idem.
36 See A rticle 3(d).
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It is suggested tha t  the existence o f  such an escape clause and 
the fact tha t  consulta tion  with independent experts is not com pulsory  
m ay be o f  far reaching consequences in the application of  the right of  
intervention. Indeed, it is to be expected tha t coastal S ta tes  
th rea tened  with oil pollution casualties will generally use these 
loopholes to exercise their rights under the Convention without in­
te rference or delay from other  parties involved. This is especially 
true when one considers that the views subm itted  by these o ther  par­
ties may play aga inst the coasta l S ta te  at the level o f  the m echanism 
o f  control provided for in the C onven tion .’*
— Before and during the exercise of  the right o f  intervention, it 
is em phasized tha t  the  coasta l S ta te  m ust “ use its best endeavours to 
avoid any risk to hum an  life, and to afford persons in distress any as­
sistance o f  which they may stand in need, and in appropr ia te  cases to 
facilitate the repa tria tion  o f  ships’ crews, and to raise no obstacle 
the re to ’’.39 These hum anita rian  considerations are in accordance 
with the well established principle o f  m ari t im e law under which all 
nations must extend necessary assistance to persons in distress at 
sea.4U
W ith respect to the exercise o f  the right of  intervention, the 
Convention em phasizes tha t  the m easures  adop ted  pursuant to this 
right,  m ust be p roportionate  to the d am ag e  actual or  threatened. In 
this connection, the Convention provides for some guidance for the 
coasta l S ta te  which must take  into account
(a) “ the extent and probability  o f  im m inent dam age if those 
measures are  not taken; and
(b) the likelihood of  those measures being effective; and
(c) the extent o f  the dam age  which may be caused by such 
m easures .’’42
F urtherm ore ,  the Convention em phasizes the obligation for the 
coasta l S ta te  not to “ go beyond what is necessary’’4' to prevent, 
mitigate or te rm ina te  the pollution or threa t thereof.
— Subsequent to the exercise of  the right o f  intervention, the 
coastal S ta te  must without delay notify the measures taken under the 
Convention to “ the States and to the known physical or corporate  
persons concerned, as well as to the Secretary  General o f  the
38 See infra pp. 10-13.
39 See A rticle 3(e).
40  See A rticle 12 o f  the Geneva Convention on the High Seas
41 S ee  A rticle 5(1).
42 S ee  A rticle 5(3).
43 S ee  A rticle 5(2).
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O rg a n iz a t io n " .44
This com pulsory  duty to notify is intended to enable the S ta tes  
or persons concerned by the intervention to verify that the m easures 
adopted by the coastal S ta te  on the high seas are in accordance with 
the provisions of  the Convention. Otherwise, parties dam aged  by 
these m easures will be entitled to com pensation .
3. Control over the exercise o f  the right o f  intervention:
Because the 1969 Convention gran ts  large powers to coasta l 
S tates,  there might be abuses in the exercise o f  these powers. 
Therefore, the Convention provides for a m echanism  o f  control over 
the exercise o f  the right o f  intervention. In this respect, the C onven­
tion creates a com pulsory  mechanism o f  peaceful se ttlement o f  d is ­
putes, arising from the exercise o f  the right of intervention and sanc­
tions against coasta l S ta tes  in cases of  wrongful exercise o f  this right.
a) Procedure o f  dispute settlement
This m echanism is spelled out in Article 8 of  the Convention 
and described in detail in an annex a t tached  to the text o f  the 
Convention. It is twofold*and consists of  a procedure for conciliation 
and, in case of  failure, com pulsory  arb it ra tion .
The procedure o f  dispute se ttlem ent may be com m enced  by any 
party  concerned .4' In this respect, the Convention provides for an ac­
celerated procedure of  settlement at the international level. U nder  
this p rocedure any party concerned may start  proceedings in the in­
te rna tiona l arena without waiting first for exhaustion of  local 
remedies .46
b) Compensation o j damage
It is suggested here tha t  the procedure for com pensa tion  
provided for in the Convention is a iming a t sanctioning any abuse in 
the exercise o f  the right o f  intervention ra the r  than at com pensa ting  
dam aged  parties.
U nder  Article 6 o f  the Convention:
“ any party which has taken m easures in contravention  o f  the provisions  
o f  the present C onvention causing d am age to others, shall be obliged  to pay 
com pensation  to the extent o f  the d am age caused by m easures which exceed  
those reasonably necessary to achieve the end m entioned in A rticle I.”
Therefore, to give rise to a right of  com pensa tion ,  the measures 
adopted by the coasta l S ta te  must first be in contravention o f  the 
Convention, and, second, fail to meet the “ reasonable m a n ” test in­
troduced in the field of  pollution control by the 1969 Convention. In
44 S ee  A rticle 3(f).
45 S ee  A rticle 8(1).
46 S ee  A rticle 8(2).
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both cases, the onus o f  p roo f  lies on the c la im an t.47
In this respect,  the unlawfulness o f  the exercise o f  the right o f  
intervention is related to a num ber  of  conditions set out in detail by 
the Convention and should generally be dem onstra ted  easily. On the 
contrary ,  it is suggested tha t  it would be more difficult to apprecia te  
the standards related to the seriousness and imminence of  a danger... 
from pollution or th rea t o f  pollution.
The sam e observation should apply to the reasonableness o f  the 
exercise o f  the right of  intervention by the coastal S ta te  and the 
proportionali ty  o f  the m easures adopted  under this right.  Indeed, 
what may seem reasonable at the time o f  the casualty may be seen in 
a different light once the danger  is over.
The idea has been developed by a French writer in the following 
terms:
"La proportionalité des m esures prises par rapport aux dangers encourus 
ne peut être appréciée qu'en tenant com pte des circonstances existant au m o­
m ent de l’adoption  de ces m esures, m êm e si les m esures en question apparais­
sent par la suite effectivem ent d isproportionnées par rapport aux consée- 
quences dom m ageab les réellem ent subies par l’Etat ayant adopté ces  
m esures. C e qui peut paraître vraisem blable et probable aussitôt après 
l’éch ouem ent d ’un pétrolier ne se réalise pas nécessairem ent et il est. en co n ­
séquence, extrêm em ent m alaisé de dém ontrer le caractère injustifié des d is­
position s adoptées par un Etat pour se prémunir d’un danger probable, et pas 
seulem ent éventuel, surtout lorsque l’action de cet Etat a pu m odifier  
notablem ent le cours des évén em en ts."4''
Consequently , it is suggested tha t the mechanism o f  sanctions 
provided for by the Convention is not likely to restrain the action of  
coasta l S tates.
B /  THE R IG H T  OF IN T E R V E N T IO N  UND ER THE 1V6V
C O N VEN TIO N : DE LEGE LATA OR DE LEGE FEREN-
DA?
The question here is to decide whether the 1969 Convention 
merely codifies an existing right o f  intervention inherent to coastal 
S tates or on the contra ry  creates such a new right.
As m entioned above, at the tim e o f  the Torrey Canyon incident, 
the U nited  Kingdom justified her intervention by invoking a right of 
self-preservation under general principles of  In ternational Law; con­
versely this right was denied by some organism s like the British 
C h a m b e r  o f  Shipping.
In this respect,  and notwithstanding the concern o f  public opi­
nion with regard to pollution or the worries o f  some governments 
over the international impact o f  unilateral measures o f  intervention
47 S ee  J.P . Q uéneudec, supra  note 13, p. 756.
48 Idem.
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on the high seas, the Torrey Canyon incident constituted a challenge 
for the “ doctr ine” . Indeed, legal writers used their best endeavours 
to justify the measures adopted by the British governm ent with some 
adequate  concept, and thus to explain the refusal o f  coastal States, 
and especially o f  G reat Britain, to consider the future convention as 
constitutive o f  a new right.41' The question appeared  to be o f  a very 
complex nature , and this explains the num ber  of  so lu tions '0 ex­
amined and the eventual recourse to a solution involving a rather 
vague concept.
F urthe rm ore ,  this problem was of  a very practical interest for 
coastal S tates in relation to pollution control.  Indeed, if the right of 
intervention o f  coastal S tates in cases of oil pollution casualties was 
a well established In ternational Law principle, the scope o f  this right 
could be broadly understood in favour o f  coasta l S tates,  no m atte r  
what the limitations brought to it by the Convention w ere . '1
A m ong  the various concepts examined by legal writers, three 
principles were mainly retained to explain the existence of  a right of 
intervention in favour of  coastal States: the concepts o f  self- 
defence '2, necessity", self-protection.54
These concepts differ in nature; nevertheless, they are all based 
on the sam e basic idea tha t in exceptional circumstances threatening 
the vital interests o f  a S tate , that S ta te  may adopt measures o f  an ex­
ceptional nature  to protect its interests.
1. The Concepts o f  self  defense:
This concept was essentially used by the British press, at the 
time of  the Torrey Canyon incident, to explain the measures taken 
by the British government.
However, this concept was usually not considered by legal 
writers as constituting a valid legal a rgum ent in favour o f  the bom b­
ing of  the sinking tanker.
49 S ee J.C . S w eeney , Oil Pollution o f  the O ceans (1968-69), 37 Fordhant I.aw 
Review, p. 155. at p. 203.
50 A m ong them  the concep ts o f  piracy on the high seas, contigu ous zone, abuse o f  
rights, were referred to by som e writers.
51 See L .J .H . L egault. The Freedom  o f  the Seas: A Licence to Pollute? (1971), 21 
University of Toronto l.aw  Journal, p. 211. at p. 216.
52 S ee E .D . Brown, supra  note 3. p. 126; L.C. C allisch . International Law and O cean  
Pollution: The Present and the Future (1972), 8 Revue Beige de Droit Inter­
national. p. 7.
53 See fc.D. Brown, supra note 3, pp. 127-30; L.C. C allisch , supra  note 52, pp. 21-22; 
J.C. Sw eeney, supra  note 49, pp. 202, 203.
54 See L A. T eclaff, International Law and the Protection o f  the O ceans from  Pollu­
tion (1971-72), 40  Fordhant l.aw  Review, p. 556 at p. 557; D M. O 'C onnell, supra 
note 24. p. 173.
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A ccording to cases and legal writers “ (s)elf-defence is a right 
against the unlawful acts or omissions of  ano ther  subject o f  inter­
national law or against the acts of  objects o f  in ternational law when 
the acts are  such as to preclude d ip lom atic  protection or the objects 
lack any link of  nationality  with a subject o f  in ternational law” ."
Here, with respect to pollution problems, the occurrence of  such 
unlawful aêts is closely related to voluntary cases of  discharge of  
noxious substances at sea. In this respect,  until the 1969 Convention, 
the question of  oil pollution was merely covered by the 1954 London 
Convention for the Prevention o f  Pollution o f  the Sea by Oil.-" This 
Convention regulates the conditions o f  discharge o f  oil at sea and 
bans such discharge in certain cases, but expressly excludes cases o f  
incidental release o f  oil from its provisions.57
Also, even if incidental discharges of oil were to be considered 
as unlawful per se, coastal S tates would not, under In ternational 
Law principles, have jurisdiction over such activities. In this respect,  
the 1954 London Convention, in accordance with traditional Inter­
national Law, recognizes the exclusive jurisdiction o f  the flag S tate  
over violations of  the prohibition to d ischarge. ,'K
M oreover, as suggested by one au thor,  in a case similar to the 
Torrey Canyon incident, the S ta te  o f  registration “ will not have 
acted illegally and the act of  the ship concerned will am oun t at most 
to negligence giving rise to prosecution under the municipal law of 
the flag S ta te “ .5V
At last, in relation to Article 51 o f  the U .N .  C harte r ,  the con­
cept o f  self-defence is often referred to with regard to “ agression, 
which is used in the sense o f  a use o f  force by hum an agents rather 
than natura l d isasters” .6"
2. The Concept o f  necessity:
Unlike the notion of self-defense, the concept o f  necessity has 
been often used by legal writers in relation to the measures taken by 
the British governm ent against the Torrey Canyon.
To define this concept with precision is som ewhat difficult, for 
the doctrine of  necessity divides writers over its understanding. Thus, 
some au thors  relate its use to the exercise of  the right of  self-defense,
55 See E .D . Brown, Supra, note 3, p. 126.
56 S ee A rticle 4.
57 S ee  A rticle 6.
58 S ee E .D . Brown, supra  note 3, p. 126.
59 Idem at p. 127; see a lso  L.C. C aflisch , supra  note 52. p. 19.
60 See Bin C heng, General Principles o f  International Law, (1953) p. 69; G. 
Schw arzenberger. The Fundam ental Principles o f  International Law (1955), 87 
( I )  Recueil des Cours, Académ ie de droit International, p. 343.
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to which it would be ancillary. For other writers, it is a notion quite 
distinct and independent from the principle o f  self-defense.M In any 
case, writers usually agree tha t the doctrine o f  necessity does not give 
rise to a right but merely excuses what would otherwise be co n ­
sidered as an unlawful act. In this respect,  it may give rise to a duty 
to com pensa te  injured parties. Moreover, it is agreed that action 
taken on the basis o f  the doctrine of  necessity is not limited to unlaw­
ful acts o r  omissions. In this respect, it might very well be used with 
regard to cases of incidental pollution. Nevertheless, the approach  
adopted by the 1969 Convention with respect to the right of  interven­
tion does not seem to fall within the fram ew ork  o f  the doctrine of  
necessity.
Thus, as previously m entioned, the doctrine o f  necessity cannot be 
the basis for the establishm ent o f  a right.
Furthe rm ore ,  if a right o f  com pensa tion  is envisaged under the 
1969 Convention as under the doctrine  o f  necessity, the approach  is 
som ewhat different in each case. As s ta ted before, the m echanism  of  
com pensation  created  by the 1969 Convention is not primarily  aimed 
at com pensa ting  dam aged  victims but ra the r  at sanctioning any 
abuses of  the right o f  intervention. Conversely, under the doctrine of 
necessity there can be no abuse o f  right because there is no right in 
the first place. S om e act, otherwise unlawful, is excused by the con­
cept of necessity, but gives rise to  com pensation  o f  injured parties, 
especially third parties, merely because they have suffered dam age 
and not because, unless excused by the doctrine of  necessity, it would 
be unlawful. It is possible to say that in this la tter  case only, the 
protection of  innocent victims is truly envisaged.
Eventually, neither the concept of self-defense nor the doctrine 
of necessity being applicable to  the establishment o f  the right o f  in­
tervention under the 1969 Convention, legal writers had recourse to 
the doctrine of  self-protection.
3. The Concept o f  self-protection:
This concept has been developed with respect to environm ental 
protection by the 12th Com m ission  o f  the Institute o f  In ternational 
Law in its report on m arine pollution in 1969.
Thus, according to the report of  the Institute:
"L es m em bres de lu C om m ission  ayant adop té le point de vue que le 
fondem ent du droit d'intervention de l'Etat riverain en cas d 'accident sur­
venu se trouve dans le droit d'autoprotection  . . ."
61 See M esures Internales C oncenant les Pollutions A ccid en telles des M ilieux  
M arins, R ésolution adoptée le 1 2 /9 /6 9 , partie B. 40  Revue Générale Je Droit 
International Public, p. I 199.
62 See Bin C heng, supra  note 60. p. 31; G. Schw arzenberger, supra note 60, pp. 343- 
345; D.W . B ow ett, The La* o f  the Sea  (1967) pp. 4-10.
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F urtherm ore ,  it was specified that:
" D e m êm e, il faut éviter de parler de lég itim e défense, non seulem ent 
parce que cette notion a donné lieu à trop de discussion s (cf. celles suscitées  
par l’A rticle 51 de la C harte), m ais surtout parce qu’elle est trop étro ite ­
m ent liée à l’idée d ’une agression , laquelle n’a rien à voir ic i.’’
“ La notion d ’accident et celle  d'une fonction  d'intérêt général s ’accor­
dent, au contraire, avec la notion de l’autoprotection . C elle-ci est l'idée de 
base vraim ent inhérente à l'existence de l'E tat. Le droit dit de nécessité et 
celui de légitim e défense n'en sont que des form es particulières, dérivées et 
d iscu tées.”
The doctrine of  self-protection is usually considered as being the 
m ost permissive, vague and controversial of  the three concepts under 
exam ination .  Based on the form ula Salus Populi Suprema Lex Esto , 
it seems to justify any m easures adopted by a S ta te  faced with some 
danger affecting its vital interests .6’ Therefore, the doctrine o f  self­
protection might constitu te  a th rea t to the existence o f  any legal 
order  within the framework of  which it is app lied . '4 In this respect, 
the existence of  such a doctrine has often been denied as a legal con­
cept and  confined to a “ psychological denom inato r:  the instinct o f  
self-preservation” .65
However, the Institute of  In ternational Law has tr ied to supple­
ment the doctrine of  self-protection and limit its exercise to pollution 
casualties within certain boundaries. These limits are  spelled out in 
the resolution which was adopted  at the issue of  the 1969 meeting of  
the Institute and are basically similar to those provided for in the 
1969 Convention with regard to a reasonable exercise o f  the right of 
in tervention.66
4. The solution adopted by the 1969 Convention:
The parties to the 1969 Convention did not deny the existence of 
an inherent right o f  in tervention o f  coastal S tates  on the high seas in 
cases o f  oil pollution casualties, without, however, referring express­
ly to any concept o f  general application.
In fact, the resolution adopted  by the Conference and a t tached 
to the Convention seems to suggest tha t  its provisions were a 
codification of  existing principles. Thus, the Resolution on Inter­
national Cooperation Concerning Pollutants Other than Oil specifies 
that “ the limitation o f  the Convention to  oil is not intended to
63 S ee Bin C heng, supra note 60, p. 344 who writes:
“ In view . . .  o f  the frequent abuses o f  the principle o f  self-preservation, it 
ma> be em phasized at the outset that a proper knowledge o f  the lim its and  
conditions o f  its application is just as im portant as know ledge o f  the ex ­
istence o f  the principle itself."
64 See G. Schw arzenberger, supra  note 60, p. 344.
65 S am e as note 14.
66 Idem
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abridge any right o f  a coasta l S ta te  to protect itself against pollution 
by any other  agen t” .
A no ther  element in favour o f  the idea o f  codification o f  an ex­
isting right is that the resolution recom m ends “ that there should be 
an extension o f  the Convention  to such pollution”  (by agents o ther  
than  oil), and “ tha t  C ontracting  S tates  which become involved in a 
case o f  pollution danger by agents other than  oil co-operate as a p ­
p ropria te  in applying wholly or partially the provisions o f  the 
C onven tion” .
The consequences a t tached  to the existence of  an inherent right 
o f  intervention outside the 1969 Convention are o f  far reaching con­
sequences for coasta l States. These consequences can be described as 
follows:
The right o f  intervention can be applied to all pollution 
casualties, whatever the noxious substance. In this respect,  the In­
sti tu te  of  In ternational Law recognized the existence o f  an inherent 
right o f  intervention without distinguishing between different pol­
luting agents. Thus, Article 1 o f  its resolution on oil pollution 
casualities states:
“ T out Etat se trouvant en face d'un danger grave et im m inent pour ses 
côtes ou intérêts connexes par une pollution ou m enace de pollution des  
eaux de la mer à la suite d'un accident survenu en haute mer ou des actions  
afférentes à un tel accident, susceptible d ’avoir des conséquences très im por­
tantes, peut prendre les m esures nécessaires pour prévenir, atténuer ou 
élim iner ce dan ger.’’6''
Also, one can imagine tha t  the right o f  intervention be applied, 
wherever the pollution casualty  occurs, including in the te rritoria l 
waters o f  a foreign S ta te .67
Moreover, the right o f  intervention can be applied whether the 
pollution is caused by a m ari t im e casualty or results from the ex­
ploration  or the exploita tion o f  the seabed.
Furtherm ore ,  it seems tha t S ta tes  not parties to the 1969 
Convention can apply the right o f  intervention to oil pollution 
casualties.
At last, parties to the 1969 Convention can interpret and apply 
its provisions in an extensive m anner  according to the principle tha t 
“ (t)he right of a S ta te  to adopt the course which it considers best 
suited to the exigencies o f  its security and to the m ain tenance of  its 
integrity, is so essential a right tha t ,  in case o f  doubt,  treaty s tipula­
tions canno t be interpreted as limiting it, even though these stipula­
66 Idem.
67 S ee  L A . T eclaff, supra  note 54, p. note 143.
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tions do not conflict with such an in te rp re ta t ion .” 6''
Eventually, it seems possible to say that 1969 Convention con­
stitutes a limited application o f  the doctrine o f  self-protection to  the 
problem  o f  pollution. In this respect, the provisions o f  the C onven­
tion and o f  the resolution o f  the Institute o f  In ternational Law seem 
sim ilar enough to indicate the influence of  the work o f  the Institute 
on the Conference. This influence is especially obvious at the level o f  
the resolution adopted  by the Conference and suggesting an ex ten­
sion o f  the provisions o f  the Convention to constitute a m ore general 
application of  the doctrine o f  self-protection to pollution casualties.
C /  E X TE N SIO N  OF THE PRIN C IPLE  OF INTER VENTION
TO S U B S T A N C E S  OTHER T H A N  OIL:
Although it falls short o f  covering all cases of  pollution, the 
1969 Convention is no t intended to limit the right o f  intervention of  
coastal S tates  to pollution by oil.
In this respect,  the parties to the Convention could not overlook 
the defects o f  such a limitation provided for by the provisions o f  the 
Convention. Therefore, a resolution was, as already mentioned, 
adopted at the end of  the Conference and annexed to the text o f  the 
C o n v e n t io n .  T h e  Resolution on International Co-operation  
Concerning Pollutants other than Oil stipulates “ that the limitation 
o f  the Convention to oil is not intended to abridge any right o f  a 
coastal S ta te  to protect itself against pollution by any other agen t.”
If  it can be argued that the provisions o f  this resolution suggest 
the existence o f  a right o f  intervention outside the Convention, these 
provisions do not specify the conditions of  exercise o f  this right in 
such case. It was especially im portan t ,  here, to know the kinds of  
noxious substances o ther  than oil along with the kinds o f  situations 
to which the right o f  intervention could be applied.
Thus, in order  to extend the scope of these principles to pollu­
tan ts  o ther  than oil, it seemed necessary to have prior knowledge of  
the existence of  substances likely to present grave and imm inent 
danger to the coastline or related interests o f  coastal S ta tes  following 
upon a m ari tim e casualty or acts related to such a casualty which 
m ay reasonably be expected to result in m ajor  harm ful conse­
quences.
The com bination  of  these elements suggested the existence of  
some inform ation related to the vessel, its cargo, the type and place 
of  incident, the na tu re  of  the coastline and related interests, climatic, 
geographical,  ecological or any other  kind o f  factors likely to have 
an im pact on the consequences o f  the incident. While it is possible to
68 The S .S . W imbledon, Perm anent Court o f  International Justice, (1923) Series A , 
N o . I, I World Court R eports, p. 163.
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assum e tha t  coasta l S ta te s  have the required knowledge with regard  
to their own environm ent,  it is difficult to imagine th a t  they will 
a lways have the accurate  in form ation  vis-à-vis the s tranded  vessel. 
This might be of  especially serious consequences since the  two 
categories o f  in form ation  are obviously interrelated and th a t  the lack 
o f  in form ation  in one case is likely to reflect on the o ther.
For these reasons, the 1969 Conference recom m ended  also tha t  
“ the In ter-G overnm enta l  M arit im e Consultat ive O rgan iza tion  
should intensify its work, in collaboration  with all interested in ter­
national o rganizations on all aspects o f  pollution by agents other 
than oil” .
In accordance with these recom m endations I M C O  and  es­
pecially its Legal C o m m ittee  took up the question o f  a possible ex- 
tention of  the right o f  intervention to noxious substances o the r  than 
oil.69 Following the work o f  the O rganization  on pollution m a tte rs  a 
new conference was convened in London in O ctober  1973 under the 
auspices o f  I M C O .70 At the conclusion o f  this conference a Protocol 
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases o f  Marine Pollu­
tion by Substances Other than Oil71 was adopted  and opened for 
signature between Ja n u a ry  15, 1974 and December 31, 1974.72
Article 1(1) of this P rotocol,  extends in te rm s essentially sim ila r  to 
the provisions of Article 1 o f  the 1969 Convention, to substances 
o ther  than oil the right o f  intervention of  coasta l states on  the  high 
seas in cases of  m ari t im e  pollution casualties. Subsection 3 ol the 
sam e article establishes the conditions o f  the application o f  the right 
o f  intervention.
For  the purpose o f  applying Article 1(1), subection 2 of  the sam e 
article defines substances o ther  than  oil as :
(a) those substances enum era ted  in a list which shall be es­
tablished by an app rop r ia te  body designated by the O rgan iza tion  
and which shall be annexed to the present Pro tocol,73 and
(b) those o ther  substances which are liable to create hazards  to 
hum an  health , to harm  living resources and m arine life to d am ag e
69 S ee  IM C O  D oc. LEG X I 1 /8 , paragraph 12.
70 S ee  IM C O  Press R elease, N ov . 2, 1973.
71 See text in (1974) 13 International Legal M aterials, p. 605.
72 A rticle 4(1 ). In this respect it m ust be noted that the Protocol m ay be ratified , ac­
cepted , approved, or acceded to the 1969 C onvention A rticle 4(4). A ccord in g  to 
A rticle 6 (1) the P rotocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day fo llow in g  the 
date on which the Fifteenth ratification , acceptance, approval or accen sc ion  with 
the Secretary G eneral o f  IM C O .
73 R esolu tion  26 adopted pursuant to A rtic le  3(1) o f  the C onvention requests IM C O  
to establish  the appropriate body at the earliest practicable opp ortunity  and in­
structs that body to draw a list o f  substances not later than N ovem b er 30, 1974. 
T h ’s list m ust be adopted by a 2 /3  m ajority o f  those present and votin g in IM C O  
and according to A rtic le  3(4) it can be am ended by resort to  the sam e procedure.
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amenities or to interfere with o ther  legitimate uses o f  the sea .’4
The foregoing distinction between poisonous substances calls 
for a num ber  of  com m ents: First of  all, it reflects an a t tem p t  on the 
part of the international community to define these substances other than 
oil which give rise to a right o f  intervention o f  coasta l states on the 
high seas in cases of  m ari t im e pollution casualit ies,1' without 
limiting the inherent natu re  o f  tha t  right.  On the contrary  the said 
distinction takes implicitly into account the unforseability and p a r ­
ticularity o f  each casually in accordance with the a rgum ents  discussed 
earlier, it confirm s the fact tha t  the 1969 Convention and its 1973 
Protocol merely codigy general principles o f  In ternational Law and 
em phasizes the "v ic t im -o r ien ta ted” ch a rac ter  o f  the provisions of 
these texts. It must be noted at this point that,  the obligation im ­
posed by Article 1(1)  and (3) on coastal states falls under the general 
com m ents  m ade  previously in relation to the application o f  the co r ­
responding provsisions o f  the 1969 Convention.
M oreover, under article 2, the substantive provisions o f  the 
1969 Convention relative to the exercise of  the right o f  intervention 
as well as the Annex a t tached  thereto a re  applicable under the pre­
sent Protocol to substances o ther  than oil.
C O N C L U S IO N S
In the final analysis, it is suggested tha t  the 1969 Convention 
along with its 1973 Protocol constitute  a m ajo r  achievement towards 
the protection  of  coasta l S ta te s ’ interests against m arine  pollution 
hazards.
S tem m ing  from a case o f  unilateral intervention relying on a m ­
biguous bases, both texts establish beyond doubt,  the existence o f  a 
right o f  intervention o f  coasta l states in cases o f  m ari t im e pollution 
casualties.
In this respect,  the approach  adopted  by the in ternational co m ­
m unity  towards the existence of  this right is a practical one and if the 
existence of  such a right seems to be recognized outside the express 
provisions of  an agreem ent this is only implicitely done. Conversely, 
the Institute of  In ternational Law explains the existence of  a right of 
intervention within the fram ework o f  the broad doctrine of  self­
protection. In this connection, both the Institute o f  In ternational 
Law and the 1969 Convention help to give a legal meaning to this ex­
tremely vague theory.
74 T his defin ition o f  pollutant substances is m odelled  on the early defin ition o f  
m aritim e pollution developed by the G roup o f  Experts on S c ientific  A sp ects o f  
M arine Pollution (G .E .S .A  M P.) established within the Fram ework o f  the 
U nited  N ation s. S ee  J. Barros, D .M . Johnston , The International Law o j Pollu­
tion  (1974) p. 6.
75 See tentative list in J. Barros, D M . Johnston , supra  note 79 pp. 9-12.
96 U.N.B.  L A W  J O U R N A L
Also, the 1969 Convention and its 1973 Protocol adop t a very 
p ragm atic  a t ti tude  vis-à-vis the exercise o f  the right o f  intervention, 
and allow coastal S ta tes  to take  all necessary m easures  according to 
c ircum stances and provided they act in a reasonable m anner.  Even­
tually , the m echanism  o f  control created  by the Convention over the 
r ight o f  intervention seems again to work in favour o f  coasta l S ta te s ’ 
interests; it is suggested, here, that,  as long as coasta l S ta te s  will use 
the  right o f  intervention within the legal fram ew ork  established by 
the C onvention,  the reasonableness o f  their action will be difficult to 
challenge.
N evertheless,  all coasta l S ta tes  do not value the ou tcom e o f  the 
1969 Convention  with the sam e enthusiasm. In this respect, C a n a d a  
was the only S ta te  party  to the Conference which never becam e 
m em ber  o f  the Convention. In C a n a d a ’s view, the C onvention is 
am ong  other  things incomplete because confined to pollution by oil 
and because it does not cover pollution cases arising from the ex ­
ploration  or the exploitation of  the seabed.76
The C anad ian  a t ti tude  m ay seem especially negative here, since 
the 1969 Convention  has proven to  provide the basis for future 
developm ents o f  the right o f  intervention. In this respect, it has been 
dem ons tra ted  tha t IM C O  offers a valuable fram ework for such 
developments.  Conversely, most European S ta tes  have become p ar­
ties to the 1969 Convention and its 1973 Protocol.  They have also ef­
ficiently com pleted the provisions o f  these texts by concluding 
regional agreem ents dealing with shipborne pollu tion .77 It is sug­
gested there that the com binat ion  of  such multila teral and regional 
ag reem tn ts  constitues a very valuable example which sould inspire a 
world wide solution with respect to  the serious question o f  the 
protection  of  the m arine  environm ent.
76 S ee  L .C . G reen. International Law and C anada’s A ntipollution  L egislation (1970- 
71), 50 Oregon Law R eview , p. 472; L .j .H . L egault, supra  note pp. 214-215. For a 
discussion  o f  the peculiar application o f  the right o f  intervention in the A rctic, see  
A .E . U tton . The A rctic  W ater P ollution  Prevention A ct and the R ight o f  Self- 
Protection  (1972), 7 U niversity o f  British Colum bia Law Review , p. 221, at pp. 
224-227; D onat Pharand, Oil Pollution  C ontrol in the C anadian A rctic (1971-72),
7 Texas International Law Journal, p. 45 , at pp. 67-71.
77 A greem ent fo r  Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution o f  the N orth Sea by Oil, 
see text in (1970), 9 International Legal M aterials, p. 359; Convention on the 
Protection o f  the M arine Environment o f  the Baltic Sea Area, see text in (1974) 13 
International Legal M aterials, p. 544.
